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11 Introduction
In the 1960s, before multitasking operating systems, virtualization was developed for
mainframe computers as a method to logically divide the mainframe resources among
diﬀerent applications. Since then, virtualization has become commonplace both on
desktop, and warehouse scale computers. Virtualization has been instrumental in
the emergence of the cloud-computing paradigm.
A relatively recent research direction is Operating System-level Virtualization. OS-
level virtualization is based on running multiple isolated userspace instances, com-
monly referred to as containers, on a single operating system kernel. The fun-
damental diﬀerence compared to traditional virtualization is that the targets of
virtualization in OS-level virtualization are kernel resources, not hardware. As a
consequence, OS-level virtualization exhibits less overhead compared to traditional
virtualization technologies, as guests can share a common instance of the operating
system kernel. The challenge with OS-level virtualization lies in compartmentalizing
kernel functionality in a way which ensures adequate isolation between, potentially
untrusted, containers.
The principal motivations behind the development OS-level virtualization technol-
ogy have been use cases in high-performance computing, shared hosting and high-
availability environments. With this in mind, it is no surprise that OS-level vir-
tualization technology is primarily found on Unix-like operating systems. How-
ever, the technological advances in mobile computing combined with the emer-
gence of use cases such as Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) policies [MVH12],
have lead to the application of OS-level virtualization technology also on mobile
devices [ADH+11, TMO+12]. With regards to BYOD, OS-level virtualization can
provide strong isolation with less overhead compared to traditional virtualization
2technologies. This is crucial on energy-constrained devices where increased CPU
usage translates into reduced battery lifetime.
Containerization is, however, no panacea. Current commercial BYOD solutions
are merely a stop-gap measure IT-departments can use to protect corporate assets
on employee devices against risks that follow from the diﬀerent sense of ownership
users may have about personal devices, as opposed corporate-issued ones. This
constitutes merely the low-hanging fruit as far as threats go. Compromise of the
host kernel makes any protection containers may provide moot. Still, this does
not mean that OS-level virtualization would not have a use as one layer in a more
comprehensive solution to mobile security, possibly combined with other platform
security measures.
Other challenges with OS-level virtualization on mobile devices lie in the area of
usability. While it is perfectly natural for containers to appear as completely sep-
arate entities in a server setting, the users of modern mobile devices have become
accustomed to seamless interaction between application on their device as well
easy access to new apps. The compartmentalization provided by containerization
needs to ﬂexible enough to accommodate diﬀerent interaction patterns and novel
use cases. This leads to an inevitable trade-oﬀ between security and ease-of-use.
To keep up with the demand of including new applications in existing workﬂows,
applications need to be containerized dynamically upon user request.
As far as target platforms go, Linux-based operating systems constitute an appealing
target for research in this particular area. Not only are Linux-based mobile platforms
prominent, recent versions of the mainline Linux kernel also include a rich set of OS-
level virtualization features. These features are modular by design, allowing them
to be applied for process containment in a variety of ways and combinations. This
brings a high-level of ﬂexibility, but the sometimes the subtle interaction between
these features makes applying them in a secure manner non-trivial. The purpose
3of this thesis is to study the use of current container-based isolation mechanisms
in the Linux kernel, in particular their applicability to novel use cases in mobile
computing. In particular, we make the following contributions:
 We describe the use of existing Linux kernel features for dynamic applica-
tion containerization, and evaluate out setup with regards to the threat
model described in Section 4.2.
 We describe the design and implementation of a prototype system
for application migration, with the aim of preserving established security
domains for applications between devices.
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a study of OS-level vir-
tualization features available in the mainline Linux kernel, as well as a historical
overview of the development of process isolation mechanisms leading up to current
container-based isolation. Chapter 3 describes the design goals behind the proto-
type, while Chapter 4 introduces the system and threat models we use as a basis
for the design. Chapter 5 presents the design and implementation of the prototype
itself. The methodology and results of the evaluation of the prototype is described
in Chapter 6. Related work is discussed in Chapter 7. Finally, Section 8 summarizes
our contributions and discusses open issues as well as directions for future work.
2 Background
In this section we give a brief overview of the origins of virtualization (Section 2.1), its
use cases, and the development of operating system-level virtualization technology
(Sections 2.3, 2.4). We also describe the current primitives for container-based
virtualization available in the Linux kernel (Section 2.5) as well security features
that are relevant to common use cases and our prototype (Sections 2.6, 2.7).
42.1 Virtualization
Conventional Virtual Machines (VMs) are eﬃcient, isolated duplicates of the real
machine they run on. The real machine or environment is known as the host, while
the virtual machines or environments are referred to as guests. Virtual machines
are created and run by a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM). The VMM has three
essential properties [PG74]:
Equivalence
The VMM provides an environment which is essentially identical to the original
machine.
Eﬃciency
Programs run in the VM environment exhibit at worst minor performance
penalties.
Safety
The VMM is in complete control of system resources.
VMMs are traditionally classiﬁed into two types:
Type I (native, or bare metal)
Type I VMMS are run directly on the host hardware, mediating access between
the hardware and a number of guests running on top of the VMM. The VMM
may be implemented in either hardware or ﬁrmware. A schematic of a Type I
VMM architecture is shown in Figure 1a.
Type II (hosted, or host-based)
Type II VMMs are software VMMs which run within a conventional operating
system environment. Guest operating systems are run on top of the VMM. A
schematic view of a Type II VMM architecture is shown in Figure 1b.
5(a) Bare metal virtualization (b) Host-based virtualization
Figure 1: VMM architectures
In both cases, the system software of each guest is a full-blown operating system in
its own right, with distinct kernels and userlands1. The guest operating systems that
run within each virtual machine either execute machine I/O instructions that the
VMM emulates, or the operating system is modiﬁed to make system calls directly
to the VMM. The latter approach is called paravirtualization.
The term virtual machine most likely originates from the IBM M44/44X experimen-
tal paging system project [Var97], which in the mid-60s emulated multiple virtual
IBM 7044 machines on a single 7044 mainframe. The M44/44X was one of the
ﬁrst instances of partial virtualization, where the virtual machine emulates multiple
instances of a signiﬁcant portion of an underlying hardware environment. A key
form of partial virtualization is address space virtualization, in which each virtual
machine consists of an independent address space.
The experimentation with partial virtualization eventually led to the creation of the
IBM CP-40 [Var97], the ﬁrst system capable of full virtualization. In full virtual-
ization, the underlying virtual machine emulates hardware to such a degree that an
unmodiﬁed guest operating system designed for the same instruction set may be run
1Userland software refers to any software part of, or running on top of the operating system
and not part of the operating system kernel.
6in isolation within the virtual machine. The successor to CP-40, CP-67 was used
in IBM's CP-67/CMS operating system for the System/360-67 mainframe. CP-
67/CMS became the ﬁrst widely available virtual machine architecture. CP-67 was
the Control Program portion of the Control Program / Cambridge Monitoring Sys-
tem (CP/CMS) time-sharing operating system. In the CP/CMS architecture, the
CP creates the virtual machine environment. Each virtual machine run a copy of
CMS, a lightweight single-user operating system. By emulating a full, stand-alone
computer for each user, CP/CMS could run any S/360 software in a time-sharing en-
vironment, not just applications speciﬁcally designed for time-sharing. In addition,
CP/CMS achieved unprecedented time-sharing performance compared to contem-
porary multi-tasking operating systems. The CP/CMS virtual machine concept was
also an important step in operating system design, as it greatly improved system
reliability and security.
The CP-67/CMS system was later reimplemented for the System/370 mainframe.
The successor, CP-370/CMS was never released as such, but became the foundation
of IBM's Virtual Machine Facility/370 (VM/370) operating system [Cre81], an-
nounced in 1972. The S/370 mainframe for use with VM/370 was the ﬁrst system
to provide hardware-assisted virtualization, i.e. architectural support that facilitates
building a virtual machine monitor. In particular the processor architecture al-
lowed the VMM to set the processor into partial execution mode [Olb78]. In this
unprivileged mode, privileged instructions by the guest operating system are not
executed directly, but generate a trap instruction which results in a context switch
to the VMM. This greatly simpliﬁes the implementation of the VMM and improves
performance, as the VMM only needs emulate the traps to allow the correct exe-
cution of the guest operating system. This technique later became known as direct
execution [BDR02].
7In CP-67, certain model-dependent and diagnostic instructions were not virtualized.
The diagnostic instruction DIAG was as used as a signal between a CMS instance and
the CP. This is one of the earliest examples of a paravirtualization interface, which
allowed the CMS to request the CP to perform ﬁlesystem operations and request
other VM services directly, avoiding the overhead of of full emulation. In VM/370,
the term hypervisor was used to refer to the virtual DIAG instruction handler2. The
term has later become synonymous with VMM.
With the commoditization of microcomputers, in particular the emergence of the
PC platform, rapidly decreasing hardware costs, and more sophisticated operating
systems, mainframe virtualization architectures based on direct execution began
to lose their appeal. The x86 architecture initially lacked hardware support for
virtualization. Hence research on virtualization for the x86 architecture predating
the virtualization extensions to the x86 instruction set focused on software-based
techniques. The ﬁrst commercial virtualization solutions for x86 were aimed at
workstation computers, allowing a guest operating system to be run on top of a
VMM running as a process on the host operating system. VMware workstation and
Virtual PC, the best known virtualization solutions for x86 at the time, utilized
dynamic binary translation [AA06] to achieve full virtualization support on the x86
architecture. Without hardware support for trap-and-emulate style direct execution
the VMM would, whenever possible, run user-mode and virtual real mode code di-
rectly. When direct execution was not possible, as in the case of kernel-mode or real
mode code, the VMM would resort to rewriting guest instructions to allow them to
be executed in non-privileged mode. Binary translation also allows cross-platform
virtualization, where the VMM is used provide compatibility between diﬀerent pro-
cessor architectures. This makes it possible to run entire operating systems written
for a particular processor architecture to be run as a guest on top of a host operating
2http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/etymology-of-hypervisor-surfaces/1710
8system written for another architecture. However, binary translation incurs consid-
erable overhead, as no instructions may be executed directly prior to the binary
translation.
Software-based virtualization enabled the widespread use of commodity hardware
for contemporary use-cases of virtualization technology:
Alternate operating systems
Virtual machines allow an alternate operating system to be run as a guest
operating system, without modifying the host operating system. Reasons for
this include use of applications which are not supported on the host operating
system, or evaluating the guest operating system without altering the host
operating system setup.
Server consolidation
Multiple virtual machines can be run on one physical server, increasing the
hardware utilization and energy eﬃciency in hosting environments. Virtual
machines can also be provisioned as needed without the need to purchase
additional hardware up-front. They can also be relocated from one physical
host to another.
Fault containment
Virtual machines can be used prevent the propagation of a software failure.
This could include studying malware or misbehaving software in a safe environ-
ment. When done, the VM can simply be discarded. Alternatively, multiple
copies of the VM might exist, allowing a malfunctioning system to be replaced
with a clean copy in high-availability environments.
Resource management
Virtual machines can also be used as a unit for resource allocation. VMs have
9enabled Internet hosting providers to provide customers with dedicated VM
instances. Such Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) are for many purposes equiva-
lent to a dedicated physical server, including allowing the customer superuser
privileges on the guest operating system, but much more cost-eﬀective, as they
share the physical hardware with other VPS instances. The customer may be
allocated a certain amount of resources, such as storage space and CPU cycles
for their VPS, to use as they please, or they might billed according to the
amount of resources used by their VM.
In the context of cloud computing, virtualization enables cloud computing platforms
to dynamically adapt to workload changes to match the current demand as closely
as possible [MH12]. This elasticity allows the cloud service provider to avoid over
or under-provisioning, which in the end reduces their expenses while still allowing
them to provide a certain level of service. A challenge in providing elasticity is the
delay between the provision of a VM, until it is ready to use.
In the mid 2000s, Intel and AMD, the major x86 CPU manufacturers indepen-
dently launched the AMD-V and Intel VT-x virtualization extensions for the x86
architecture. The ﬁrst generations of chipsets supporting the virtualization exten-
sions allowed trap-and-emulate style direct execution. However, with the advances
in software-based virtualization, hardware-assisted virtualization on the x86 archi-
tecture alone didn't oﬀer any signiﬁcant improvement in performance. The sec-
ond generation of chipsets added support for MMU virtualization, increasing the
performance of virtualized system memory. Linux supports the x86 virtualization
extensions through the Kernel-based Virtual Machine3(KVM).
A fairly recent research direction with the aim of providing more lightweight vir-
tualization compared to hardware or host-based virtualization is operating system-
3http://www.linux-kvm.org
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Figure 2: Container-based virtualization
level virtualization. OS-level virtualization revolves around running multiple isolated
userspace instances, commonly referred to as containers on a single operating system
kernel. A schematic of a container architecture is shown in Figure 2. A fundamental
diﬀerence compared to the virtualization approaches mentioned above is that the
object of virtualization is not hardware, but global kernel resources. With the rise
of Linux-based mobile platforms, operating system-level virtualization mechanisms
in the Linux kernel have received attention with regards to virtualization on mo-
bile devices. The smaller resource footprint compared to traditional virtualization
approaches make these more suitable for use on resource constrained devices.
2.2 The Dilemma of the Omnipotent Root
Traditional Unix systems make a distinction between two types of processes; privi-
leged processes, and unprivileged processes. Privileged processes are able to bypass
all regular access control checks made by the system kernel, whereas unprivileged
processes are subject to access control checks based on the process' credentials.
Each process has certain identiﬁers associated with it; a real User Identiﬁer (UID)
and Group Identiﬁer (GID), an eﬀective UID and GID, a saved Set-User-ID (SUID)
and Set-Group-ID (SGID), and possibly a number of supplementary GIDs. The
eﬀective UID and GID together with the supplementary group list usually act as
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a process' credentials. The real UID identiﬁes the user who launched the process,
and is considered the processes' owner. The real GID is determined by the primary
group of that user. The saved SUID and SGID are the UID and GID respectively
the process had when it began its execution (at the point of the last exec() call).
Usually the real, eﬀective and saved UIDs are the UID of the user who executed the
program.
Traditionally, processes are considered privileged by the virtue of having the eﬀec-
tive UID 0. For convenience, this UID is by convention allocated to a superuser
account, usually named root. The ability to bypass any access control checks is due
to an eﬀective UID of 0 being handled as a special case by access control checks in
the kernel. These checks serve two purposes; ﬁrstly, they are used to uphold Discre-
tionary Access Control (DAC) policies, which are used to protect ﬁlesystem objects
(see Section 2.7), and second, they protect functionality oﬀered by the kernel which,
if unchecked, could be used to undermine the underlying security measures provided
by the kernel, e.g. memory protection, hardware access control etc.
Unfortunately concentrating the privilege to a single point of contact, the superuser,
makes adhering to the principle of least privilege [SS75] diﬃcult. Delegation of priv-
ileges in traditional Unix relies on setting the setuid access control ﬂag on program
binaries. This has the eﬀect of setting the eﬀective UID to the owner of the ﬁle when
the binary is executed, as opposed to the UID of the owner of the process. When
set on root-owned binaries, the spawned process will be privileged with regards to
all access control, regardless of the intended functionality of the application. This
makes setuid binaries an attractive target for intruders looking to compromise the
security of a system. Programming errors in setuid binaries, in particular ones that
could be exploited for arbitrary code execution, are especially dangerous. The Unix
C Application Programming Interface (API) provides means for privileged processes
to drop its privileges, either temporary or permanently4. This occurs by toggling
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the eﬀective UID between the processes real UID or saved SUID. However, in order
to be eﬀective, these mechanisms require the program to be structured in a way
that minimize the portions of the program run with privileges, and ideally allow it
to drop its privileges permanently as soon as possible. Even then, errors within the
privileged portions remain as dangerous as before, leaving much to be desired with
regards to avoiding over-privilege and the ability to compartmentalize functionality
available to privileged processes.
Modern Unix-like operating systems try to address this disparity between privileged
and unprivileged processes in various ways. Linux divides the privileges traditionally
associated with superuser into distinct units, known as capabilities5, which can be
independently adjusted programmatically on a per-thread basis. Capabilities can
also be set via ﬁle system attributes. Linux capabilities are based on a proposal part
of the 1003.1e draft for the Portable Operating System Interface of Unix (POSIX)
standard. Even though the draft was eventually withdrawn, the capability model
employed by Linux is sometime referred to as POSIX capabilities.
Capabilities6allow for more ﬁne-grained control of privileges, but this alone is not
enough to meet the requirements of use cases such as server consolidation, where it
is desirable to delegate some, but not all, administrative functions to less trusted
parties, and simultaneously impose system-wide mandatory policies to system re-
sources. The Unix access control model makes compartmentalization of this kind
diﬃcult, as security domain the superuser has privilege over encompasses the entire
system.
4http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/007904975/functions/setuid.html
5https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.2/
capfaq-0.2.txt
6We note that a more common meaning for the term capability comes from capability-based
security [Lev84], where it is used to refer to transferable, unforgeable tokens use to prove proper
authorization access an object.
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Fundamentally operating system-level virtualization is about compartmentalizing
functionality available to processes. In Unix-like operating systems, mechanisms
such as chroot() have for a long time been used to provide a modest level of
compartmentalization for server applications. The problems with chroot() jails
are well understood. We describe some of these in the following section, and more
sophisticated approaches are discussed in the subsequent sections.
2.3 Chroot jails
The chroot()system call allows one to change the root directory of a running pro-
cess and its children, limiting their visibility of the global ﬁlesystem hierarchy to a
single subtree. The modiﬁed environment achieved via the chroot() system call is
commonly called a chroot jail.
Chroot jails were never intended as a security mechanism, but as a development
tool for building software in a conﬁned tree, separated from the main directory
structure 7. Even so, the chroot mechanism has been used as a security measure
to limit ﬁlesystem access. The classic example is the File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
daemon, which is largely dependent on the security provided by a chroot jail to
secure anonymous FTP access [Ker10, p.367].
While the chroot mechanism does provide a modest level of compartmentalization,
it has serious shortcomings in terms of functionality and eﬀectiveness. There are
7According to Dr. Marshall Kirk McKusick, (as reported by Kamp and Watson [KW00]):
According to the SCCS logs, the chroot call was added by Bill Joy on March 18, 1982 approximately
1.5 years before 4.2BSD was released. That was well before we had ftp servers of any sort (ftp did
not show up in the source tree until January 1983). My best guess as to its purpose was to allow
Bill to chroot into the /4.2BSD build directory and build a system using only the ﬁles, include
ﬁles, etc contained in that tree. That was the only use of chroot that I remember from the early
days.
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several possible routes for unprivileged processes to break out of a chroot jail [Ker10,
p.368]:
 The chroot() call does not change the working directory of the calling pro-
cess. Thus, the call to chroot() is typically preceded or followed by a call
to chdir(). If the directory change is omitted, the working directory of the
process might reside outside the new root directory tree. If this is the case,
the calling process, or child processes inheriting the parent's working directory,
can use relative pathnames to access directories outside the chroot jail.
 If a process obtains an open ﬁle descriptor for a directory outside the chroot
jail (by, for instance, opening the directory before the chroot() call or by
receiving the ﬁle descriptor from another process outside the chroot jail via an
Unix domain socket), then calling fchdir() with the open ﬁle descriptor will
result in a current working directory outside the chroot jail.
By design, a privileged process can escape a chroot jail by setting its working di-
rectory to the altered root directory and change the root directory again by calling
chroot() for a subdirectory 8. Thus, the process has obtained a current working
directory outside of the chroot jail. Now it can traverse the directory tree up to the
original root directory.
Some BSD derivatives prevent this by changing the current directory to the new root
directory upon a chroot() call if the process is already running with an altered root
directory9. This prevents the current directory from being further up the directory
tree than the new root directory.
8This method is documented in the Linux Programmer's Manual page on chroot(2) from
September 20, 2010 (release 3.75).
9This behavior is documented in the OpenBSD Programmer's Manual page on chroot(2) from
June 17, 2013 (release 5.4).
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2.4 FreeBSD jails
The shortcomings of Unix discretionary access control facilities and chroot() in
providing adequate compartmentalization of diﬀerent security domains in shared
hosting environments prompted the development of the jail [KW00] facility in the
FreeBSD operating system. While the compartmentalization provided by chroot()
is limited to ﬁlesystem visibility, the FreeBSD jail mechanism extends the compart-
mentalization to include processes and networking. Jails can be created by privileged
processes by calling the jail() system call, but once a process has entered a jail, it
can never leave.
Processes in a jail have several restrictions placed on them. Filesystem access is lim-
ited to subtree visible in the jail. The chroot mechanism is used to provide ﬁlesys-
tem compartmentalization. It has, however been augmented to refuse backwards
traversal across the ﬁrst level chroot directory and disallow open ﬁle descriptors to
directories at the point of the chroot() call.
Processes inside a jail cannot see or interact with processes outside the jail. Pro-
cess visibility in FreeBSD is provided through the procfs ﬁle system and sysctl
mechanism. Both only divulge information on processes in the same jail to a jailed
process. To prevent Inter-Process Communication (IPC) across jail boundaries, ac-
cess to System V IPC primitives is inhibited. This restriction may be lifted on a
per-jail basis10, but as System V primitives in FreeBSD share a single namespace
across the host and jail environments, doing so will not only enable IPC within a
jail, but also across jail boundaries.
Each jail is assigned a set of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Processes in the jail
are unable to bind a socket with other IP addresses apart from the ones assigned to
the jail. Attempts to bind using wildcard addresses silently use the jailed addresses
instead. Alternatively binding to IPv4 or IPv6 accesses can be hindered altogether
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on a jail-by-jail basis. A jail can also be created with a virtual network stack of its
own. This allows a jail modify its own (virtual) network conﬁguration, interfaces,
protocol addresses, routing tables etc. Typically sockets within a jail are restricted
to IPv4, IPv6 and local (Unix) sockets. Access to protocol stacks without explicit
support for jails, including raw, divert sockets used by the kernel packet diversion
mechanisms, and routing sockets can be enabled via a conﬁguration parameter.
The capabilities of privileged processes running inside a jail are severely restricted.
Privileged processes are not allowed to modify kernel runtime parameters, such as
sysctl settings, load kernel modules or create device nodes. Mounting and un-
mounting ﬁlesystems is prohibited by default, although the ability to mount certain
jail-friendly ﬁlesystem types can be granted on a per-jail basis. File ﬂags related
to BSD securelevel security proﬁles cannot be modiﬁed.
2.5 Resource namespaces
A kernel resource namespace [Ker13a] is an abstraction around a global system
resource. Fundamentally, a namespace is a container for a set of identiﬁers. Identical
identiﬁers may appear in multiple namespaces, but may refer to diﬀerent resources in
each namespace. In eﬀect, processes within a namespace appear to access an isolated
instance of the resource. Typically, the existence of such isolation is invisible to the
processes within the namespace.
The principal application for resource namespaces are containers utilizing lightweight
operating system-level virtualization. Common use cases for containers are VPS
environments. When applied to a VPS environment, multiple distinct user-space
software stacks are run in distinct containers on top of a shared operating system
10Jail parameters are documented in the FreeBSD System Manager's Manual page on jail(8)
from October 12, 2013 (FreeBSD release 9.3)
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kernel. This can be attractive in high-performance computing, as lightweight OS-
level virtualization can provide less overhead and improved performance compared
to traditional bare metal or host-based virtualization techniques.
Another use-case for resource namespaces is the implementation of process Check-
point and Restart (CR) functionality [Bie06]. In CR, the objective is to store the
execution state of a running process to a process image and restore it at a later
point in time, continuing the execution of the process from the state stored in the
image. Restoration can occur on another system than the one the process origi-
nated from. This is called live migration, and can be useful for load-balancing or in
high-availability environments.
The challenge in CR lies not so much in storing the process state, but in restoring
the process image, as a process might rely on possessing certain global resources,
such as process IDs, IPC identiﬁers, ﬁlesystem paths etc. When a process is restored
there is no guarantee that the process can reuse the same global identiﬁers, as they
might be in use by other processes. The two main approaches to address this issue
have been to either make sure global identiﬁers are unique across all machines in the
computing cluster process migration might occur on, or to provide means of allowing
the same set of identiﬁers to be repeated on the same system. A major challenge
with the former approach is to allow the system to scale. Resource namespaces, in
turn, make the latter possible.
Resource namespaces can also be used as an isolation measure between processes
and system resources. While not strictly speaking a security mechanism, namespace
isolation and access control are nevertheless related. They both prevent processes
from having (unrestricted) access to system resources. Whereas conventional access
control is based on an explicit authorization and is visible to process being con-
trolled, namespace isolation prevents access by making only those resources that a
process is allowed to access visible in its environment. However, as we shall see,
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namespace isolation is typically more coarse-grained than the corresponding access
control measures. On the other hand, the isolation provided by namespaces has the
advantage of being transparent to the process conﬁned within the namespace.
Our primary interest in this thesis is the utilization of the Linux namespaces for
resource isolation in combination with security features provided by the Linux ker-
nel. While our use case involves the migration of applications, we limit ourselves
to so called cold migration, i.e. the migrated application is required to have ter-
minated before the migration occurs. We consider the problem of live migration
orthogonal to our eﬀorts; as long as the container setup provides an environment
suﬃciently independent from the host environment, support for a live migration
system which serializes the state of a running application to ﬁlesystem objects can
easily be incorporated as an add-on.
Current versions of the Linux kernel implement six diﬀerent types of resource name-
spaces. Linux namespaces are instantiated when a process is created via the
clone()11 system call, or a process disassociates itself from its parent's namespace
via the unshare() system call. The namespace to be unshared is in both cases
identiﬁed via a bit ﬂag deﬁned in bits/sched.h. The creation of namespaces, with
the exception of user namespaces, is a privileged operation.
Existing namespaces may be joined via the setns() system call. Linux namespaces
are identiﬁed by ﬁle descriptors visible via the proc ﬁlesystem (procfs). In Unix-
like operating systems this special ﬁlesystem provides information about existing
processes represented as a ﬁle system hierarchy. It is typically mapped to a mount
point at /proc. Each running process is represented by a directory under /proc,
/proc/<pid> , where <pid> is the processes' numerical id. Each namespace sup-
ported by the kernel has an entry under the /proc/<pid> /ns directory. These
11Essentially clone() is a generalized version of the traditional Unix fork() system call, the
primary, and traditionally only means of process creation.
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Namespace clone() ﬂag Kernel version
Mount namespaces CLONE_NEWNS 2.4.19
UTS namespaces CLONE_NEWUTS 2.6.19
IPC namespaces CLONE_NEWIPC 2.6.19
PID namespaces CLONE_NEWPID 2.6.24
Network namespaces CLONE_NEWNET 2.6.24  2.6.29
User namespaces CLONE_NEWUSER 2.6.23  2.6.29
Table 1: Linux namespaces
entries behave like ﬁle descriptors. The inode number of the ﬁle descriptor are
unique to the namespace they represent. Hence, the inode number can be used to
determine if two processes coexist in the same namespace.
The diﬀerent namespaces and corresponding clone() ﬂags are show in Table 1. The
kernel version indicates the version of the Linux kernel in which the corresponding
namespaces were introduced. Mount namespaces compartmentalize the visibility of
mounted ﬁle systems. UTS namespaces allow for multiple host names and Network
Information Service (NIS) domain names to be used on a single host. IPC name-
spaces control the visibility of IPC primitives not represented by ﬁle system objects.
PID namespaces interact with procfs to cordon oﬀ visibility to process hierarchies,
as well as allowing the same PIDs to be possessed by several processes (in diﬀerent
namespaces) simultaneously. Network namespaces compartmentalize access to net-
working primitives such as network interfaces, IP addresses and routing tables as
well as port numbers. User namespaces compartmentalize UIDs and GIDs.
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2.5.1 Mount namespaces
Mount namespaces [Ker13a] were the ﬁrst namespaces to be implemented in the
Linux kernel. This accounts for the, rather undescriptive, NEWNS (short for "new
namespace") identiﬁer assigned to namespace type constant. The design of Linux
mount namespaces was inﬂuenced by the Plan 9 from Bell Labs operating sys-
tem [Bie06].
The central design goals behind the Plan 9 [PPTT90] operating system was to
integrate graphics and ubiquitous networking into a coherent, Unix-like framework.
Similarly to traditional Unix systems, access to system services are provided through
a single ﬁlesystem interface. In fact, Many facilities that under Unix are accessed
through various ad-hoc interfaces like BSD sockets, fcntl(2), and ioctl(2) are in Plan
9 accessed through ordinary read and write operations on special ﬁles analogous to
Unix device ﬁles. Most system services, including the windowing system 8½, are ﬁle
servers, which provide special ﬁles or a directory tree representing resources they
provide access to. As all mounted ﬁle servers export the same ﬁlesystem interface
to users and client programs, access to each service looks the same regardless of
the implementation behind them. Some might correspond to local ﬁlesystems, some
to remote ﬁlesystems accessed over a network, some to instances of system servers
running in userspace (like the windowing system), and some to kernel interfaces.
Plan 9 introduced the notion of private namespaces [PPT+92]. Every process can
have its own view of the system's services by creating its own tree of ﬁle-server
mounts. This allows for, for instance, /dev/cons always to refer to the user's termi-
nal device and /bin/date to the correct version of the date command to run, but
which ﬁles those names represent depends on circumstances such as the architecture
of the machine executing date.
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In a similar manner, Linux mount namespaces isolate the set of ﬁlesystem mounts
visible to a group of processes. The mount() and umount() system calls only aﬀect
the mount namespace associated with the calling process. In contrast to Plan 9
namespaces, which cannot be joined by other means than direct inheritance, Linux
provides the setns() system call, which can be used to join existing namespaces.
In Linux, mount namespaces interact interestingly with bind mounts, another ﬁlesys-
tem feature inﬂuenced by Plan 912. Bind mounts act as a sort of symbolic link at the
ﬁlesystem level. In Linux they are implemented entirely within the virtual ﬁlesys-
tem (VFS) layer, making them independent of any particular low level ﬁlesystem.
Bind mounts allows to remount parts of the ﬁlesystem hierarchy at diﬀerent mount
points, making them visible at multiple points in the ﬁlesystem hierarchy simulta-
neously. When a mount operation occurs, it is possible to mark the mount and
its submounts as shared or slave mounts. If a mount is marked shared, mounts
and unmounts within the subtree propagate to any bind-mounted instances of the
mount and vice versa. A slave bind mount receives propagated mounts and un-
mounts from its master (the original mount), but mounts within the slave are not
propagated back. The propagation may occur across mount namespace boundaries,
enabling schemes in which e.g. hot-pluggable mass storage devices may be made
visible within unprivileged containers (with their own root ﬁlesystem) by mounting
them within a shared mount point with the host.
2.5.2 UTS namespaces
The name of UTS namespaces [Ker13b] derive from the name of the structure passed
to the uname() system call; struct utsname. There UTS stands for Unix Time-
sharing System, which is a term used for early Unix research systems developed at
Bell Labs by Ken Thompson and Dennis Ritchie. The purpose of UTS namespaces is
12http://plan9.bell-labs.com/magic/man2html/1/bind
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1 struct utsname {
2 char sysname [ ] ; /* Operating system name ( e . g . , "Linux ") */
3 char nodename [ ] ; /* Host name */
4 char r e l e a s e [ ] ; /* Operating system r e l e a s e ( e . g . , "3 .13 .0") */
5 char ve r s i on [ ] ; /* Operating system vers ion ( e . g . b u i l d number e t c . ) */
6 char machine [ ] ; /* Hardware i d e n t i f i e r */
7 #i f d e f _GNU_SOURCE /* The domainname member i s a GNU ex tens ion */
8 char domainname [ ] ; /* NIS or YP domain name */
9 #end i f
10 } ;
Listing 1: Deﬁnition of the utsname structure from the GNU C Library
to isolate two system identiﬁers returned by the uname() system call; nodename and
domainname. The deﬁnition of struct utsname from the GNU C Library (glibc) is
shown in Listing 1. In practice, this allows VPS containers to have a hostname and
NIS domain name of their own.
The implementation of UTS namespaces is simple enough to function as an illus-
trative example of the changes to the mainline Linux kernel that the introduction
of resource namespaces has required. Let us consider the gethostname() system
call which is used to get the system hostname from kernel space into userspace.
Like in the case of uname(), the information originates from an in-kernel represen-
tation of the utsname structure. Unlike uname(), gethostname() merely copies the
nodename member, not the entire utsname structure.
Prior to kernel version 2.6.19, in which UTS namespaces were introduced, the
gethostname() system call would access the nodename member of a global utsname
structure, the system_utsname. Listing 2 shows a fragment of the implementa-
tion of the gethostname() system call prior to the introduction of UTS name-
spaces. From kernel version 2.6.19 onwards, two helper functions, utsname() and
init_utsname(), were introduced. Consequently users of system_utsname were
modiﬁed to use these helpers instead. Instead of accessing a global system_utsname,
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1 asmlinkage long sys_gethostname (char __user *name , int l en )
2 {
3 int i , e r rno ;
4 . . .
5 i = 1 + s t r l e n ( system_utsname . nodename ) ;
6 . . .
7 /* Copy the nodename member from the g l o b a l system_utsname to userspace */
8 i f ( copy_to_user (name , system_utsname . nodename , i ) )
9 errno = −EFAULT;
10 . . .
11 }
Listing 2: Fragment from the gethostname() system call prior to 2.6.19
1 stat ic i n l i n e struct new_utsname *utsname (void )
2 {
3 return &current−>nsproxy−>uts_ns−>name ;
4 }
Listing 3: Deﬁnition of utsname() helper function in 2.6.19
the utsname() helper returns a pointer to a utsname structure in the UTS name-
space associated with the current process. Listing 3 shows the deﬁnition of
utsname(). The nsproxy member in the task_struct for the current process
is a structure which contains pointers to all namespaces associated with the process.
In current kernel versions, the deﬁnition of the gethostname() system call is similar
to the fragment shown in Listing 4. Access to the utsname structure occurs via the
helper function.
The gethostname() example illustrates a pattern common to the currently imple-
mented Linux namespaces; previously global resources are encapsulated in a per-
process namespace. A handle to the namespace, and in extension any resources it
encapsulates is maintained for each process.
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1 asmlinkage long sys_gethostname (char __user *name , int l en )
2 {
3 int i , e r rno ;
4 struct new_utsname *u ;
5 . . .
6 u = utsname ( ) ;
7 i = 1 + s t r l e n (u−>nodename ) ;
8 . . .
9 i f ( copy_to_user (name , u−>nodename , i ) )
10 errno = −EFAULT;
11 . . .
12 }
Listing 4: Fragment from namespace-aware gethostname() system call
UTS namespaces might seem relatively harmless. However, access to them must be
restricted to avoid scenarios where applications relying on the hostname are fooled
into misbehaving because the system appears to have an unexpected hostname.
For instance, applications might use the hostname as part of a lock ﬁle pathname.
Running such an application inside a UTS namespace with an altered hostname can
be used to circumvent the lock ﬁle, possibly leading to misbehavior in application
instances running in diﬀerent UTS namespaces.
2.5.3 IPC namespaces
IPC namespaces [Ker13a] allow processes to unshare Inter-Process Communication
primitives and have a private set of primitives which are identiﬁed by other means
than ﬁlesystem pathnames. Namely this includes System V IPC objects and POSIX
message queues.
25
2.5.4 PID namespaces
The objects of isolation in PID namespaces [Ker13a, Ker13c, Ker13d] are process
ID numbers. Processes in diﬀerent PID namespaces may obtain the same PID. In
addition, PID namespaces may be nested. A process a receives a PID for each layer
of PID namespaces it resides in. A process is visible in its own namespace and all
ancestors, although via a diﬀerent PID number. A process in a particular namespace
is not visible in child namespaces.
The ﬁrst process created within a PID namespace receives a process ID of 1 within
the namespace and becomes thus the init process for the namespace. In a similar
manner to the init process in the root namespace of the host that has a special role
in the system, so do init processes within a namespace. In particular, the init
process of a namespace becomes the parent of processes that become orphaned
within the namespace. In VPS environments, the init process for the namespace
is also responsible for starting system daemons and other processes part of the
environment within the namespace.
In order to prevent the essential init process in the root PID namespace from
being accidentally killed, only signals for which the process has established signal
handlers are delivered to the init process. Similarly, the init process in child PID
namespaces only receives signals for which it is has established signal handlers from
processes within its namespace. However, contrary to the init in the root PID
namespace, the init within a child namespace may receive signals from processes
in ancestor namespaces. Unless the init process has established signal handlers for
them, these are ignored as well, with the exception of SIGKILL and SIGTERM. These
are forcibly delivered, and can be used by processes in ancestor PID namespaces
to stop or terminate the child namespace init process. If the init process in a
namespace terminates for some reason, the kernel proceeds to terminate all other
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processes within the namespace via SIGKILL signals, essentially shutting down the
container in a VPS environment. This also has the eﬀect of destroying13 the, now
empty, PID namespace.
Instances of the proc ﬁlesystem mounted from within a PID a namespace, display
only information regarding processes inside the namespace (and nested namespaces)
via /proc/pid/ . While a procfs instance mounted from outside the PID namespace
a process belongs to will display pid subdirectories for processes in another PID
namespace, those PIDs will not be meaningful for processes in any other PID name-
space. System calls made by processes always interpret PIDs in the context of the
PID namespace in which they reside. As various utilities like ps rely on the procfs
being mounted at the traditional /proc mount point, PID namespaces are usually
used in combination with a mount namespace to allow the procfs for the namespace
to replace the parent profcs mounted at /proc. Another possibility is to conﬁne
processes in a PID namespace to a chroot() jail (see Section 2.3) and mount a
procfs at /proc within the conﬁned directory hierarchy.
2.5.5 Network namespaces
Network namespaces [Ker14] encapsulate resources useful to containers from a net-
working perspective. Each network namespace contains a logical copy of of the
network stack, with ts own network interfaces, IP addresses, IP routing tables, port
numbers and /proc/net directory (as long a procfs is mounted from within a name-
space, as with PID namespaces).
13An unusual corner case related to the dismantling of PID namespaces is that the namespace
will not be destroyed as long as /proc/pid /ns/pid descriptor to it is held open. It is, however,
impossible to create new processes in the namespace (via setns() or clone()), as the init process
for the namespace is no more (clone() fails in this case with an ENOMEM error value to indicate
that a PID cannot be allocated.)
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Network namespaces can be conﬁgured from userspace via the ip utility14. By
convention, conﬁguration ﬁles that would ordinarily be stored under /etc, such
as /etc/resolv.conf, can be made speciﬁc to a particular network namespace by
storing them under /etc/netns/<name> , e.g. /etc/netns/mynetns /resolv.conf.
In applications that are aware of network namespaces this search path will precede
/etc when looking for global conﬁguration ﬁles. For applications that are unaware of
network namespaces, the namespace speciﬁc conﬁguration ﬁles may be bind mounted
over their regular counterparts under /etc. By utilizing mount namespace, this can
be done without disrupting the behaviour of processes outside the namespace. The
ip utility also supports processless network namespaces by exposing the namespace
descriptor via /var/run/netns/name /. Processless network namespaces may be
kept alive by keeping the corresponding ﬁle descriptor open.
2.5.6 User namespaces
The principal motivation for user namespaces [Ker13e] is to allow unprivileged users
to safely unshare namespaces. Users will be privileged with respect to the new
namespace, but restricted to resources they already own. User namespaces also
provide separate limits and accounting for UIDs in diﬀerent namespaces.
As with PID namespaces, user namespaces may be nested. The parent of a user
namespaces is the user namespace of the process that creates the child user name-
space. An exception to this rule is the initial host system user namespace, which
has no parent. Each user namespace may have zero or more children.
The current implementation of user namespaces introduces two new types to rep-
resent in-kernel UIDs and GIDs; kuid_t and kgid_t [Cor12]. The purpose of the
kernel UID and GID is to describe a process's identity on the host system, regardless
14Network namespace support was added to ip in version 3.0.0 of iproute2
http://www.linuxfoundation.org/collaborate/workgroups/networking/iproute2
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1 typedef struct {
2 uid_t va l ;
3 } kuid_t ;
Listing 5: In-kernel UID deﬁnition
of any UIDs it may appear to have inside a user namespace. The namespace-speciﬁc
IDs visible to userspace retain the integer types uid_t and gid_t as before. How-
ever, most privilege checks are done based on the kernel IDs.
The kuid_t and kgid_t types are simply C typedefs for single-ﬁeld structures con-
taining the corresponding integer UID or GID type (see the deﬁnition of kuid_t in
Listing 5). This makes kuid_t and kgid_t type-incompatible with the integer UIDs
and GIDs. This is intentional in order to cause mismatched operations between ker-
nel IDs and userspace IDs cause compiler errors. The rational is that this will help
to avoid a large portion of potential errors in kernel code that deals with user and
groups IDs.
The userspace UIDs map one-to-one to kernel UIDs. The translation occurs at
the boundary between kernel space and userspace. The mapping is established by
writing mapping information to the /proc/pid /uid_map and /proc/pid /gid_map
ﬁles corresponding to one of the processes in the user namespace the mappings
aﬀects. Initially the ﬁles are empty. Mapping rules are added to the ﬁles in the form
of integer 3-tuples consisting of:
< ID−inside−namespace > < ID−outside−namespace > < length >
where < ID − inside − namespace > together with < length > deﬁnes a range
of UIDs/GIDs inside the aﬀected namespaces that are mapped to a corresponding
range in the immediate parent namespace starting at < ID−outside−namespace >.
Note that from the point of view of userspace processes, mappings are always done
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relative to two user namespaces, although from the point of view of the kernel the
mappings are always ﬂattened directly to and from kernel IDs, even with multiple
layers of nested user namespaces.
Mapping rules may be added by processes either inside the aﬀected namespace, or
inside the immediate parent user namespace. In addition, the process performing the
mapping must have write access to /proc/pid /uid_map and /proc/pid /gid_map,
which are owned by the UID that created the user namespace the process identi-
ﬁed by pid belongs to. The process performing the mapping must also have the
CAP_SETUID (for uid_map, or CAP_SETGID for gid_map) capability in the aﬀected
user namespace.
Mappings may only be established once per user namespace, i.e. only one write
can be performed to any mapping ﬁles belonging to a particular user namespace. If
the process performing the mapping possesses the CAP_SETUID (for UID mappings)
or CAP_SETGID (for GID mappings) in the parent namespace, it is allowed to deﬁne
mappings to arbitrary user or group IDs in the parent user namespace by performing
a single write to the corresponding mapping ﬁle that may contain multiple newline-
delimited triples. If the process does not possess the necessary capabilities in the
parent namespace (as in the case of the initial process in a newly created user
namespace), it is only allowed to write a single line to each mapping ﬁle to map its
UID or GID inside the namespace to its corresponding eﬀective UID or GID in the
parent namespace. This arrangement guarantees that privileged processes inside a
user namespace remain unprivileged with regards to the parent namespace, i.e. they
cannot elevate their privileges via an ID mapping unless they already possessed the
corresponding privileges in the parent user namespace.
A problem with this arrangement as described so far is that it does not lend itself to
server consolidation, which is perhaps the most important use case for the namespace
isolation mechanisms in the ﬁrst place. The reason is that in server consolidation, it
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is often desirable to allow an unprivileged user with regards to the host system eﬀec-
tively full privileges in a container assigned to them, including the ability to create
additional user accounts. The problem we encounter in the above arrangement is
twofold; ﬁrstly, the user initializing the container, i.e. creating the namespaces lacks
the privilege to add mappings for other than the initial UID and GID inside the con-
tainer to his UID and GID on the host; secondly, the user lacks knowledge of suitable
ID ranges outside the namespace to use as targets for mapping distinct IDs inside
the namespace to. These issues are solved in userspace by introducing the notion
of subordinate UIDs and subordinate GIDs. These are IDs, typically above 100000
that can be allocated to users, either manually, or automatically upon user creation
by the root user15. The allocations are stored in /etc/subuid or /etc/subgid re-
spectively. These can be mapped to UIDs in containers the owning user creates via
the use of the setuid programs newuidmap and setgidmap. This userspace support
allows unprivileged users to establish ID mappings from a container user namespace
to subordinate IDs assigned to them.
2.6 Resource Control
In addition to resource namespaces and access control, resource control provides a
third approach to limiting the access processes have to system resources. It concerns
itself with the utilization CPU, memory, disk I/O and other ﬁnite resources that are
consumed by processes. It is instrumental in preventing Denial of Service conditions
due to resource exhaustion.
15Version 4.2 of the shadow tool suite adds support for subordinate ID assignment. Manual
assignment can be done using command line options added to the usermod utility, and automatic
assignment can occur based on appropriate stanzas added to the login.defs conﬁguration ﬁle.
The newuidmap and newgidmap programs are also provided by the shadow tool suite. http://pkg-
shadow.alioth.debian.org/
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Linux Control Groups (cgroups) provide a mechanism for partitioning processes
into hierarchical groups that constitute units of resource control. All processes in
a control group are bound by similar resource consumption criteria. Often this
criteria may be inherited by the parent group. As such, control groups provide a
uniﬁed interface to resource control scaling from single processes to entire userspace
instances, as in the case with containers.
Control groups support resource limiting, e.g. memory consumption limits that may
not be exceeded; prioritization, e.g. the assignment of a certain share of the CPU
throughput to a particular group; accounting that allows the use of system resources
to be measured for e.g. billing purposes. Control groups can also act as the unit for
freezing processes for the purposes of CR.
2.7 Discretionary and Mandatory Access Control
The core access control model in Linux is based on Unix Discretionary Access Con-
trol (DAC). In Unix DAC, the owner of a ﬁlesystem object is allowed set the security
policies associated with the object. In other words, the access control policies for
ﬁlesystem objects are at the discretion of their respective owners. Unix DAC is typ-
ically implemented via a bit mask associated with the inode of a ﬁlesystem object.
The bit mask represents a simple access control list (ACL), with each bits corre-
sponding to a certain type of privilege, e.g. read, write, execute etc. Traditionally,
distinct access rights can be assigned to the owner of the object, users in a certain
group associated with the object, and other users not in one of the previous two
categories.
The security requirements for many use cases require more ﬁne-grained access control
than what traditional Unix DAC can provide, including the ability to specify a
centrally controlled access control policy, which cannot be overridden by users. This
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type of access control is commonly referred to as Mandatory Access Control (MAC).
MAC is typically formalized as an access control matrix which constrains the ability
of a subject to access or generally perform some sort of operation on a target object.
The necessary infrastructure for MAC in Linux is provided by the Linux Security
Modules (LSM) framework. The LSM framework consists of a series of hooks in
kernel code at points where access control decisions are made. LSMs implement these
hooks, providing access control decisions based on their individual access control
schemes. In MAC LSMs, the subjects are typically individual processes, as opposed
to users.
MAC LSMs in Linux can be categorized into two groups; label and path-based.
In label-based LSMs, all subjects (processes) and objects on the system (such as
ﬁles) are assigned security labels, typically stored as extended ﬁlesystem attributes
(xattrs). All interaction between subjects and objects is subject to review by the
LSM, which consults its security policy to determine if the access should be allowed.
Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux) is currently the most widely deployed label-
based LSM. It was originally developed at the Trusted Systems Research division
of the United States National Security Agency (NSA) for the purposes hardening
Linux for use in government and military systems which manage classiﬁed informa-
tion. SELinux is an implementation of the Flux Advanced Security Kernel [SSL+99]
(FLASK) operating system security architecture. SELinux provides a feature-rich
policy deﬁnition language used by software maintainers and administrators to for-
mulate a system policy. SELinux also provides a rigorously structured reference
policy that is commonly used as a basis for the system policy shipped with Linux
distributions using SELinux such as Fedora and Red Hat Enterprise Linux distribu-
tions.
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SELinux policy conﬁguration requires expertise in the behavior of applications sub-
ject to MAC. SELinux policies also tend to be quite large. The Fedora SELinux
policy for instance deﬁnes over 700 distinct classes of subjects, over 3000 classes of
objects and close to 100 000 access rules. As a result, SELinux has been criticized
for being too complex for many use cases. The Simple Mandatory Access Control
(SMACK) LSM was developed as an alternative to SELinux. SMACK also features
a label-based scheme providing a basic form of MAC, but with a much simpler
grammar for policy deﬁnition. SMACK supplied the MAC for the Mobile Simpliﬁed
Security Framework [KREA11] (MSSF) used in the MeeGo mobile platform, and its
successor Tizen 16.
In contrast, path-based LSMs do not make access control decisions based on on-
disk security labels (e.g. xattrs), but policy deﬁnition is done based on ﬁlesystem
pathnames. This has the beneﬁt of policies which are more easily amendable to
support diﬀerent access control policies for the diﬀerent appearances of the same
object (e.g. symbolic links, bind mounts etc.), but may require additional controls
to avoid circumventing the policy by means of such alternate pathnames. Path-based
LSMs in Linux are AppArmor17 and TOMOYO18.
The development of TOMOYO was also in part motivated by the perceived com-
plexity of SELinux policy conﬁguration. Most MAC LSMs support a permissive
mode, in which policy violations are logged, but not prevented. This can be useful
during policy conﬁguration. A distinguishing feature of TOMOYO is a learning
mode which allows a policy to be automatically generated based on the observed
behavior of processes.
16https://www.tizen.org/
17http://wiki.apparmor.net
18http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/
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AppArmor is a successor to security extensions originally developed for Immunix, a
commercial Linux distribution specializing in host-based application security. Im-
munix Inc., which was eventually acquired by Novell also developed AppArmor for
Novell's SUSE Linux. AppArmor is currently maintained by Canonical Inc., and is
the default LSM used by Ubuntu.
3 Design Goals
The research question behind this thesis is to study the feasibility to utilize existing
Linux kernel features to enable the ability to migrate the data and settings of user
installed applications between distinct, general purpose devices. We consider this
functionality to be useful for both personal devices and shared environments. Usage
scenarios involving personal devices include setting up a new device purchased by a
user, as well as rental devices, which remain in a user's possession only for a limited
time. Shared environments may include In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) systems or
smart displays which would allow users to temporarily provision application to the
devices. In these cases a user would typically only have a transitory relationship
with the device. Since the same device may allow multiple users to interact with it,
possibly simultaneously, providing suitable isolation of applications becomes espe-
cially important. Diﬀerent device stakeholders may also wish to place restrictions
on the use of the device, which might diﬀer from the restrictions on the device from
where the migrated application originates.
When used for server consolidation, containers are typically used to house entirely
self-contained environments, which share only the underlying operating system ker-
nel. Even with potentially untrusted containers, assuming that host kernel com-
promise is not viable, this kind of setup poses very few points of contact to other
containers. Also, migration of such an environment to another physical server is
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straightforward, especially when the underlying hardware and host operating sys-
tem setups are largely homogeneous. If the underlying storage is network-based, the
migration can be a simple manner of shutting down the container on one host, and
starting it on another.
In this work we consider deployment scenarios where it is infeasible for containers to
be entirely self-contained. Consider for instance application containers, i.e. contain-
ers that only have a single application or service instance running inside them are
commonly used for fault containment. When dealing with user-facing applications,
it is desirable to allow applications to be containerized dynamically upon user re-
quest without the need for users to possess the expertise to conﬁgure the container
environment themselves. Such applications may need to interact with host services,
e.g. applications with graphical user interfaces should still be allowed to draw to
the screen, receive input etc., even though it is desirable that access to a subset of
resources remain strongly compartmentalized.
While container migration in server environments is well understood, the migration
of dynamically established applications containers that share various resources with
the host or other containers poses additional challenges. The origin and target
environment can exhibit heterogeneity, while it would be desirable for users that the
containerized application would behave in the same manner as it did prior to the
migration. Speciﬁcally, our problem statement is twofold:
 Can existing operating system-level virtualization mechanisms in the Linux
kernel be used to set up, on demand, isolated security domains for applications?
 Can such dynamically established security domains be migrated from one de-
vice to another?
It should be noted that an application design pattern fairly common in modern
mobile platforms are applications that store user data and preferences in the cloud,
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allowing the data to be retrieved when the user installs the application on a new
device. This approach, however, comes with a number of drawbacks. Firstly, these
kinds of cloud synchronization solutions are application or platform speciﬁc, and in
the latter case requires use of platform speciﬁc libraries. Secondly, such applications
tend to require continuous network connectivity during use in order synchronize user
data with the cloud. Thirdly, these kinds of solutions can raise privacy concerns
regarding the information stored in the cloud.
3.1 Requirements
In order to address both security and usability aspects in our design, we have iden-
tiﬁed the following requirements:
Isolation: Dynamically set up domains should be isolated from each other and
other applications present on the device. However, the isolation mechanisms in
place should not restrict the use of common operating system services (provided the
applications inside the container possess the appropriate permissions).
Authentication: It should only be possible to migrate application containers to
a device that belongs to a user or is temporarily in use by a user (such as a rental
device). Furthermore application migration should only be done upon explicit user
consent. If applications are allowed to be migrated to to a third party device without
user consent, security issues such as privacy violation, abuse of credentials etc. might
follow.
Policy migration: Although security policies associated with the migrated ap-
plication container must be preserved, the existing security policies of the target
device must take precedence during the migration. Some devices might have secu-
rity policies established by other entities than the user. Mechanisms such as content
protection schemes might disallow user applications certain permissions. Circumven-
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tion of such security measures by migrating applications with more lenient security
policies on other devices must not be possible.
Full cleanup: It must be possible to fully remove a migrated application container
and all associated data from a device. Failure to completely wipe out application
data might lead to privacy violations etc., especially in the case of rental devices.
Interoperability: Applications should be able to to be migrated and continue
operation without modiﬁcation and without relying on uncommon frameworks or
programming languages.
Deployability: In order to make the adoption of the system feasible, the core
operating system of the target devices must not be modiﬁed. Even the same OS
from diﬀerent vendors can diﬀer and core parts of the OS should not be interchanged,
since this might introduce software ﬂaws, leading to system instability or security
issues. Furthermore requiring signiﬁcant changes to the operating system is sure to
hamper the adoption of such systems.
Performance: As the ultimate target of the application migration scheme are mo-
bile devices with limited resources in terms of battery capacity, processing power,
and storage space, the mechanisms facilitating application migration should be suf-
ﬁciently lightweight in order to be fast and eﬃcient on contemporary mobile devices.
Usability: From a usability perspective, the migration process should be easy to
learn, easily remembered as well as eﬃcient and satisfying to use. Users should not
be prompted for any information that is possible to obtain from the previous setup
on the originating device, such as permissions, application preferences etc.
3.2 Assumptions
For the purposes of this thesis we limit ourselves to cold migration, i.e. the migrated
application is halted before the migration occurs. We consider the problem of live
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migration orthogonal to our eﬀorts; as long as the container setup provides an
environment suﬃciently independent from the host environment, support for a live
migration system which serializes the state of a running application to ﬁlesystem
objects can easily be incorporated as part of future work.
If users continue to use a migrated application container on both devices (i.e. the
source and target device), the state of the applications will diverge. A previously
migrated application container along with its state should be migratable back to the
original device. In such cases synchronization of diverged application states becomes
a challenge. For out purposes we consider a usage scenario where only one canonical
copy of a container exists at any time. When the container is migrated, it ceases to
be available on the source device.
In our design, the integrity of the container relies in part on the integrity and
conﬁdentiality of the transfer of data from one device to another. We leave securing
this transfer outside the scope of this thesis, although we acknowledge that this is
an integral part of the security of the scheme if it were to be deployed in a real-world
scenario.
4 System and Threat Model
4.1 System Model
In this section we explain the speciﬁcs our target system model. The model de-
scribed here is generalized in such a way that it may apply to many diﬀerent variants
of Linux-based operating systems. Our design is intended to allow for integration
into systems which ﬁt this general model. The main reference points used in the
formulation of the system model are the freedesktop.org19 base platform for desk-
top software that has become a de facto standard in modern desktop GNU/Linux
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Figure 3: System model
distributions, and the MSSF which plays a somewhat similar role on some mobile
Linux-based platforms. An overview of the components that comprise the system
model are shown in Figure 3. These are described in detail below.
PermissionsModern application platforms use permission systems to protect access
to resources that warrant protections, such as hardware capabilities and personal
data. Prime examples of permission use can be found in prominent mobile plat-
forms such as Android20 and iOS21. However, the wide disparity in how permissions
are presented to users and how users are involved in permission assignment is evi-
dence of the fact there is no consensus on the best way to design such permission
system [FEF+12].
For our purposes we consider a permission system where applications can acquire
permissions in three ways:
19http://freedesktop.org
20https://www.android.com/
21https://www.apple.com/ios/
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 Automatically at install time.
 At install time as a result of explicit user consent.
 At runtime as a result of explicit user consent.
If allowed by the device policy the user is allowed to grant a blanket permission
when prompted for consent on a particular access control decisions. In this case, the
user is not prompted again for consent on that particular permission and application
pair, but the permission is granted permanently.
Device Policy: The device security policy is the collected state of the system
security framework. It is inﬂuenced by the needs of diﬀerent stakeholders. For
contemporary mobile platforms, this includes the platform provider, device manu-
facturer, mobile operator and in some cases an enterprise administrator. The device
policy is not always managed centrally.
For our purposes, the device policy consists of a list of permissions that may be
assigned to applications. The device policy deﬁnes if a permission is allowed or
denied automatically, or if the permission is granted only after being approved by
the user. If a permission is not deﬁned in the device policy, it is denied by default
to any application which might request it.
Package manager: The package manager is responsible of overseeing the instal-
lation of applications. The package manager also grants any automatically granted
permissions to the application, as per the device policy, and prompts the user to
conﬁrm any permissions that require his or her consent. The result is an application
policy, which accurately depicts the permissions the application has been granted
on a particular system.
Reference monitor: Most contemporary Linux-based systems include a frame-
work for IPC at a higher level of abstraction than traditional Unix System V IPC
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primitives. This usually involves a message bus architecture, such as in the case
of D-Bus in freedesktop.org-compliant systems, or a component object model, such
as in the case of the Android Binder [FCH+11]. Both of these facilitate Remote
Procedure Calls (RPC) between applications. The reference monitor is responsible
for mediating access on the IPC channel.
We note that adding support for allowing LSMs to mediate IPC occurring over the
message bus is being pursued by several parties. At the time of writing, active ef-
forts are being made in order to enable mediation of D-Bus IPC by AppArmor 22,23
and SMACK24. Similarly in Android, SELinux allows userspace object managers to
retrieve the SELinux context of the calling process in RPC occurring over Binder. It
has even been proposed that the SELinux context of the caller should be passed with
each Binder call25 in order to avoid potential Time-of-Check Time-of-Use (TOC-
TOU) race conditions26in cases where the calling process context changes during the
time between the Binder call and the context query is made. The X Access Control
Extension (XACE) allows the access control of X11 display server graphics objects
in a manner similar LSMs in the Linux kernel. XACE support for SMACK is also
being done [Sha09].
Policy daemon and agent: The policy daemon decides if intercepted access at-
tempts are allowed or not. In systems where the underlying policy is managed by an
LSM, the policy daemon might not have knowledge of the policy itself, but consult
the LSM when policy decisions are to be made. In our system model we describe
the policy daemon as a separate entity, but it is entirely possible that the responsi-
22https://blueprints.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+spec/security-o-apparmor-dbus
23https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/Specifications/Oneiric/AppArmorDbus
24https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=47581
25https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=72971
26CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/367.html
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bilities of the reference monitor and policy daemon are placed in a single software
component.
The policy agent is the part visible to end users. It's responsible for interacting with
the user when the user is involved in access control decisions.
4.2 Threat model
In our threat model we assume that a certain subset of containers are fully controlled
by an attacker, while the remaining containers are legitimate. Attacker goals include:
Compromise of Legitimate Containers or Host: Means of compromise include
illegitimate access to information belonging to legitimate containers or host including
ﬁle system resources, information about running processes, network traﬃc etc. More
serious threats include the ability to mount Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks on
network communications or IPC, or the ability to aﬀect the control ﬂow of programs
executed in a legitimate container or the host.
Privilege Escalation: The ability to obtain privileges not originally granted to
processes in the container. This includes both applications permissions, as well as
operating system capabilities, which could potentially allow the attacker to override
the protections set in place by the permission system.
Denial of Service: The ability to disrupt the normal operations of the host or
legitimate containers. Means of DoS include resource exhaustion of CPU, memory
or persistent storage.
An earlier version of our threat model appears in the survey by
Reshetova et.al. [RKNA14].
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Figure 4: Architecture
5 Design and Implementation
In this section we present our design and describe the implementation of a proof-of-
concept prototype.
5.1 Architecture
Our design consists of a client-server architecture comprising of a client (cntctl),
and a server daemon (cntctld)). Each server instance operates in one of two distinct
modes of operation we call host mode and remote mode. In host mode, the cntctld
server provides a number container management services to local clients, including
the creation of containers and the execution of containerized application. In remote
mode, the server principally acts as an endpoint for container migration for remote
clients. An overview of the architecture is shown in Figure 4. Container migration in
the other direction (back from the target to source device) uses a symmetric setup.
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The cntctl client implements the user-visible interface for container management.
This component is entirely unprivileged, and needs a server instance operating in
host mode to perform privileged operations, such as namespace creation on its be-
half. Container creation consists of the host mode server spawning an initial process
in the container (henceforth referred to as the container init) which together with
the host mode server coordinates the setup of the containerized environment, and
ﬁnally executes the target applications placed inside the container.
The target environment for our prototype enforces applications permissions using
SMACK. The device policy deﬁnes a number of SMACK domains that correspond
to security domains applications may be granted access to. For the purposes of
our prototype we consider a Three Domain Model27. The top-level security do-
mains are subdivided into peer domains corresponding to distinct permissions (e.g.
System::Audio for audio access). In our prototype the host mode server is respon-
sible for the loading container speciﬁc policy rules in accordance with the device
policy to the SMACK policy maintained in the kernel. In a real-world deployment
we see that this will occur in collaboration with the system components described
in Section 4.1.
5.2 Filesystem compartmentalization
To minimize the overhead with regards to ﬁlesystem resources that must be made
available to the container (e.g. shared libraries and other dependencies) our design
allows such resources to be shared between the host and a guest container. In
order to avoid information about processes on the host or other containers to be
accessible from inside a container, and to prevent processes inside the container from
27https://wiki.tizen.org/wiki/Security:SmackThreeDomainModel
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potentially inﬂuencing processes outside the container, we conﬁne the container to a
subtree where host resources are made available via the use of an overlay ﬁlesystem28.
Overlay ﬁlesystems are a way to provide a uniﬁed view of two directory trees (some-
times referred to as branches) as a single hierarchy. The directory trees involved
in the union are designated as the 'upper ', and 'lower ' branch. When a particular
pathname exists in both branches, the corresponding ﬁlesystem object in the upper
branch is visible in the union, while the object in the 'lower' branch is either hidden
or, in the case of directories, merged with the corresponding object in the 'upper'
branch. The lower branch may be read-only, as the overlay ﬁle system provides copy-
on-write semantics for operations on the union. When a ﬁle residing on the 'lower'
branch would be modiﬁed, the operations results in a copy-up of the ﬁle to the 'up-
per' branch. The modiﬁcations are always made to the copy in the 'upper' branch.
Removal of ﬁles and directories in the union are recorded to the 'upper' branch as
whiteouts, which cause the corresponding pathname to in the 'lower' branch to be
ignored in the union. The whiteout itself is also hidden.
The particular overlay ﬁlesystem implementation utilized in our prototype is Over-
layFS 29by Miklos Szeredi. OverlayFS is characterized as a 'hybrid' approach to
overlay ﬁlesystem because unlike its predecessors, such as Unionfs30 and Aufs31,
which provide virtual ﬁlesystems with persistent inode renumbering and dynamic
branch management, OverlayFS merely modiﬁes pathname lookups. This occurs
mainly in the readdir() system call. As a result, ﬁlesystem objects that appear
in the union do not all appear to belong to that ﬁlesystem. Non-standard behavior
includes any ﬁle locks obtained before a copy-up not applying to the copied up ﬁle
as that is essentially a new ﬁle appearing with the same pathname. Similarly the
28The term 'overlay ﬁlesystem' is somewhat of a misnomer, as most implementations in fact
operate on directory subtrees that may very well exists on the same ﬁlesystem.
30http://unionfs.ﬁlesystems.org/
31http://aufs.sourceforge.net/
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inode number of the ﬁle may change as a result of a copy-up, as well as the device
number if the branches exist on diﬀerent ﬁle systems. We expect that for many
applications these diﬀerences can be ignored. OverlayFS mounts are also limited to
two branches, although several OverlayFS mounts may be nested in order to unify
more than two directory trees. The level of nesting is currently limited to a stack of
two OverlayFS mounts by an arbitrary value hardcoded into the kernel.
We also utilize the fact that modern Linux distributions, including Debian and
Fedora, have introduced /run to store ﬁles that contain runtime information which
does not require preserving across reboots. The /run directory is a mount point for
a tmpfs instance, a temporary ﬁle storage facility that appears as a mounted ﬁle
system, but stores ﬁles in volatile memory instead of persistent storage. This location
replaces several existing locations described in the Filesystem Hierarchy Standard32,
including /var/run, /var/lock, and /dev/shm33. For backwards compatibility,
these directories are provided by symbolic links pointing to appropriate locations
under /run.
In our design, each container is assigned a subtree in the ﬁlesystem hierarchy that is
a result of the union of the host root ﬁlesystem and a writable branch which acts as
a copy-on-write overlay for the container. This makes ﬁles on host root ﬁlesystem
visible, and even writable inside the container with the necessary privileges, but any
31https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs.git/?h=overlayfs.
current
32http://www.pathname.com/fhs/pub/fhs-2.3.html
33Recently there has also been attempts to switch /tmp to tmpfs as well. Reasons for this
include minimizing the wear on Solid-State Drives (SSDs) utilizing ﬂash storage technology with
a limited number of write cycles. These attempts have, however, been met with a fair amount
on controversy. Counter-arguments revolve around the added complexity caused by breaking the
register/cache/memory/disk hierarchy. For instance, as tmpfs size is limited to a certain percentage
of main memory, it is not suitable for storing (very) large ﬁles. For the purposes of this thesis we
assume a that /tmp is backed by a tmpfs and treat it like other transient ﬁle storage.
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Figure 5: Container ﬁlesystem compartmentalization
changes made to the root ﬁlesystem are stored by the copy-on-write overlay, and
thus do not aﬀect the actual host root ﬁlesystem. Transient ﬁles stored in /run are
not visible to the container, as they exists on a separate ﬁlesystem and thus not
made visible by OverlayFS. The copy-on-write overlay also allows us to isolate ﬁles
for migration. We use another, nested overlay for local, non-migratable container
speciﬁc ﬁles (see Section 5.7). The local overlay remains read-only. Additional
locations, for which copy-on-write semantics are undesirable can be made available
to the container via bind mounts. All this occurs before the initial process in the
container is spawned. A schematic view of the setup is shown in Figure 5
We note that as an alternate approach, the read-only root ﬁlesystem for the container
can be constructed by bind mounting desired locations from the host to locations
where the conventional mount points have been prepared. This precludes the need
for overlay ﬁlesystems, but also prevents writing to shared locations from inside the
container.
In order to prevent processes from accessing ﬁlesystem resources outside the subtree
designated for the container, the container init process employs the Linux speciﬁc
pivot_root() system call in combination with the conventional chroot() system
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call and a distinct mount namespace created for the container to render the host
root ﬁlesystem inaccessible to processes placed in the container.
The pivot_root() system call is typically used during a Linux boot sequence to
change from a temporary root ﬁlesystem (e.g. an initrd) to the actual root ﬁlesystem
on a block device. As its name suggests, the pivot_root() system call moves the
mount point of the old root ﬁlesystem to a directory under the new root ﬁlesystem,
and places the new root ﬁlesystem at its place. When done inside a distinct mount
namespace, the old root ﬁlesystem can be unmounted, thus rendering the host root
ﬁlesystem inaccessible for processes inside the container, without aﬀecting processes
belonging to the root, or any other mount namespaces on the host system.
At the time of writing, the implementation of pivot_root() also changes the root
directory and current working directory of the process to the mount point of the new
root ﬁlesystem if they point to the old root directory. This prevents kernel threads
from keeping the old root directory busy with their root and current working direc-
tory. It seems that the intention is to keep changes to the process directories separate
from changes to the root ﬁlesystem, so in the future there may be a mechanism for
kernel threads to explicitly relinquish any access to the ﬁlesystem. This would al-
low this mechanism to be removed from pivot_root()34. As the root directory and
working directory may or may not change as a result of calling pivot_root(), proper
usage dictates that he caller of pivot_root() must ensure that processes with root
directory or current working directory at the old root operate correctly regardless
of the behavior of pivot_root(). To ensure this, we change the root directory and
current working directory to the mount point of the new root ﬁlesystem subsequent
to invoking pivot_root(), then proceed to perform a lazy unmount of the old root
ﬁlesystem. This makes the mount point immediately unavailable for new accesses,
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1 /* Change the current working d i r e c t o r y (cwd) o f the c a l l i n g process
2 * to the new root d i r e c t o r y . */
3 i f ( chd i r ( r o o t f s ) == −1) { /* Abort i f change o f cwd f a i l s */ }
4
5 /* put_old conta ins a r e l a t i v e path to a l o c a t i on under the new r o o t f s
6 * used as the d e s t i na t i on fo r the o ld r o o t f s a f t e r the p i v o t . */
7 i f ( pivot_root ( " . " , put_old ) == −1) { /* Abort o f the p i v o t f a i l s */ }
8
9 /* Depending on the implementation o f p ivot_root () , the root d i r e c t o r y
10 * and cwd of the c a l l e r may or may not change . Ca l l i n g chroot () ( and
11 * sub s equen t l y chd i r ( ) ) here makes sure t ha t the root d i r e c t o r y (and
12 * cwd) change r e g a r d l e s s o f whether pivot_root ( ) has changed the root
13 * d i r e c t o r y or not . */
14 i f ( chroot ( " . " ) == −1) { /* Abort i f the change o f root d i r e c t o r y f a i l s }
15
16 /* Perform la z y unmount o f the o ld r o o t f s . This makes the mount po in t
17 * immediate ly unava i l a b l e f o r new acces se s . */
18 i f ( umount2 ( put_old , MNT_DETACH) == −1) { /* Abort i f l a z y unmount f a i l s */ }
Listing 6: ﬁlesystem compartmentalization system call sequence
but the actual unmount is delayed until a time when the mount point ceases to be
busy. The corresponding sequence of system calls is shown in Listing 6.
5.3 Process compartmentalization
Process compartmentalization is provided by a separate PID namespace created for
each container. This, combined with the mount namespace used for ﬁlesystem com-
partmentalization allows a separate procfs instance to be mounted at /proc inside
the container. As described in Section 2.5.4, profcs instances mounted from within
a PID namespaces only provide information on processes within that namespace.
An IPC namespace can also easily be combined with the setup described so far. It
34This design rationale is documented in the Linux Programmer's Manual page on pivot_root(2)
from July 13, 2012 (release 3.73).
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requires no additional setup apart from adding the appropriate ﬂag to the clone()
call when the container init process is spawned.
As described in the previous section of ﬁlesystem isolation, we also took care not
to expose transient ﬁles which might contain process runtime information or com-
munication primitives visible as ﬁlesystem objects, such as Unix-domain sockets,
FIFOs and shared memory used for IPC within the container. To ﬁnish this oﬀ,
environment variables which expose the (from within a container meaningless) loca-
tions of such IPC sockets may be pruned from the environment inside the container.
Explicit exceptions can be made in cases where it is desired to allow applications
within containers access to host services. For instance, we make communications
sockets for the X11 display server and PulseAudio sound system35available inside
the container along with the environment variables that deﬁne their location. This
is achieved by bind-mounting the corresponding sockets to their respective locations
within the container subtree. This allows applications inside the container to draw
to the screen and play audio in a regular fashion. Access to the communication
sockets are still mediated by the permission system, as described earlier.
5.4 User compartmentalization
In our prototype, the containerized applications are run with the UID of the user who
created the container. Multiple concurrent users can in principle be supported by
running multiple instances of the host mode daemon. This approach, however, does
not lend itself well to usage models where the user does not necessarily have a Unix
user account on the target device. Examples of such usage scenarios are IVI systems
or smart displays which act as shared computing environment with which the user
has only a ﬂeeting encounter with. For these kinds of environments we suggest a
35http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/PulseAudio/
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model where multiple users are served by the same server instance running under a
dedicated UID with a certain number of subordinate UIDs assigned to it. A distinct
user namespace is created for each container, and UIDs inside user namespaces are
mapped to distinct subordinate UIDs.
5.5 Network compartmentalization
Linux provides several possible approaches to provide networking for a container
running in a distinct network namespace. A new created network namespace is
initially empty, except for a loopback interface. Additional interfaces must be as-
signed to the network namespace via a kernel interface exposed through the netlink
protocol. However, each network interface may only be present in a single network
namespace at any time. In hosts with multiple physical interfaces, one or more
physical interfaces may be dedicated to a container. In devices where this is not
practical, the container must be assigned a virtual interface. We will discuss the
use of two diﬀerent types of virtual interfaces: Virtual Ethernet and MACVLAN
interfaces.
A Virtual Ethernet device consists of a pair of virtual interfaces that act essentially
as a pipe, i.e. Ethernet frames transmitted one peer are received by the other. When
used with containers, a pair of Virtual Ethernet devices is created on the host. One
peer is assigned to the container network namespaces, while the peer remaining on
the host is connected to a virtual bridge. This can be used to either create virtual
networks between container by linking them via diﬀerent bridges, or provide a link
to the outside network by binding the bridge to bound to a physical interface.
Whereas Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs) allow a single network interface to
be mapped to multiple virtual networks, MACVLAN interfaces perform the opposite
role, allowing a single physical interface (usually referred to as the lower device) to be
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mapped to multiple virtual interfaces, each with its own MAC address. MACVLAN
interfaces can operate in three distinct modes:
Private: In this mode the interface cannot communicate with any other endpoints
on the lower device i.e. all incoming frames are dropped if their source MAC address
matches one of the MACVLAN interfaces present on the host. This isolates con-
tainers from each other, preventing direct communication between containers, but
not from the outside network.
Bridge: This modes provides MACVLAN endpoints bound to the same lower device
a bridge that allows the to communicate with each other or the host directly without
transmitting frames through the physical link.
Virtual Ethernet Port Aggregator (VEPA): In VEPA mode, transmitted
frames are always sent out via the lower device, even if they are destined to other
endpoints bound to the same device. If the physical switch on the receiving complies
with the 802.1Qbg standard for Edge Virtual Bridging36, it may act as a Reﬂective
Relay (a.k.a Hairpin switch ), allowing it to transmit the frame back on the same
link it received it on. This not only allows containers to communicate with each
other and the host, but has the added beneﬁt of allowing network level policies
to be enforced by the switches (e.g. DHCP ﬁltering). Unfortunately this mode of
operation is not widely supported yet.
5.6 Device compartmentalization
Each container is created with a distinct /dev with a minimal set of device nodes (in
particular /dev/null, /dev/zero, /dev/full, /dev/random and /dev/urandom).
In addition, we share certain device nodes with the host by bind-mounting them to
36http://www.ieee802.org/1/pages/802.1bg.html
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appropriate locations on container creation. For instance, by making /dev/dri/card0
we available enable hardware accelerated graphics within the container.
It is important that the devices that are visible to containers are chosen with care,
especially in cases when processes within the container are allowed privileges. For
instance, access to the device node corresponding to the block device housing the
host root ﬁlesystem would allow a suitably privileged process inside the container
to circumvent the ﬁlesystem compartmentalization described in Section 5.2.
5.7 Permission compartmentalization
Placing the container in a distinct SMACK domain without aﬀecting existing policies
on the device poses some challenges. At the time of writing, the Linux MAC LSMs
have not yet been made aware of containers. In our prototype, we instead utilize the
nested overlay ﬁlesystem to allow the relabeling of native binaries executed within
the container. This allows both an containerized and non-containerized version of
the application to co-exist on the host. The relabeling consists of appending an
identiﬁer unique to the container to the existing label. The host mode daemon
is responsible for relabeling SMACK policy rules pertaining to the containerized
application and loading them to the enforced policy. This particular functionality
requires the host mode daemon to obtain privileges to override existing SMACK
labels and modify the enforced policy.
5.8 Application migration
Application migrations consists of simply transferring the contents of the copy-on-
write overlay to the target device. This can occur over a network connection, or
some other medium. We have also experimented with a usage scenario where users
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carry the migratable containers with them on portable USB drivers. In this case,
the containers were encrypted on-disk using a passphrase known to the users.
The overlay also contains a description of permissions assigned on the host device
and the origin of the particular permission. When the containerized environment is
recreated on the target device, the container speciﬁc policy is reconciled with the
device policy on the target device according to the following rules:
1. If the device policy always allows a permission, it is granted automatically.
2. If the device policy always denies a permission, or the permission is not deﬁned
by the policy, it is never granted for any reason.
3. If the device policy disallows a blanket prompt for a permission, the user is
prompted for consent upon each startup of the container.
4. If the device policy allows a blanket prompt for a permission, and the user has
consented to a blanket prompt on the source device, the permission is granted
automatically.
6 Results and Evaluation
Our design employs resource namespaces and mandatory access controls to conﬁne
applications within dynamically isolated domains based on the notion of containers.
Resource namespaces provide the necessary building blocks to compartmentalize op-
erating system resources available to containerized applications. The MAC based
on the Linux LSM framework provides the basis of the permission system in our
prototype. In this section we describe how each of requirements identiﬁed in Sec-
tion 3.1 were taken into account in the design and how well out withstands against
the threat model described in Section 4.2.
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Isolation: Although Linux resource namespaces provide a ﬂexible toolset for re-
source isolation, we believe our design is evidence of the fact that the evaluation
of the security of container-based virtualization solutions should in detail take into
account resources crossing namespace boundaries. Due to our goal of allowing con-
tainers to share resources with the host system, we needed to consider many venues
of potential information leakage on the ﬁlesystem layer, including transient runtime
ﬁles and host device nodes. In this light, we believe an approach to container con-
struction where the containerized environment is initialized as empty as possible,
and resources to be shared with the host are introduced one by one in a controlled
manner is imperative in avoiding unintended information leakage.
Authentication: We did not explicitly address the issue of authentication in our
design because existing solutions for demonstrative authentication, such as those
widely-deployed in Bluetooth and Wiﬁ protected setup [SVA09] can be layered on
top of our design.
Policy migration: In our prototype we explored the migration of policies in the
context of two devices with potentially conﬂicting device policies. Our scheme allows
the policy associated with a migrated container to retain user policy decisions to
the extent allowed by the local device policy.
Full cleanup: In our design, the copy-on-write overlay isolates all ﬁles subject
to migration. Therefore, removing the ﬁles in the copy-on-write overlay should be
suﬃcient to remove all potentially sensitive data associated with the container from
a device after successful migration.
Interoperability: Since our design relies modifying the environment container-
ized applications are run in, rather than modifying the applications themselves, we
believe our approach can be applied to a wide variety of applications. For appli-
cations which depend on services running on the device for persistent storage (e.g.
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databases etc.), the container could be extended to include private instances of nec-
essary dependencies. For the purposes of our prototype we only considered relatively
self-contained applications which relied on ﬁles for persistent storage, but in princi-
ple our design could be extended to compartmentalize interdependent applications
as the cost of a higher overall resource footprint.
Deployability: In this work, we have intentionally limited ourselves to existing
features available in the mainline kernel with the exception of OverlayFS, which at
the time of writing has been proposed for inclusion in Linux 3.1837. Furthermore, we
have based our design on a system model which ﬁts real-world Linux-based systems.
https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/9/29/350
Performance:
We evaluated the performance of our design with a small number of unmodiﬁed
applications. Of these we wish to note especially Extreme Tux Racer 38an OpenGL39
racing game which requires 3D acceleration to operate properly.
Bind-mounts proved to be very ﬂexible in allowing devices and IPC sockets to be
shared across container boundaries. This allowed us to containerize applications
utilizing hardware-accelerated OpenGL graphics with no human-perceivable degra-
dation in performance.
We note that our prototype exhibits increased overhead in ﬁlename lookups due to
the design of OverlayFS. For the applications we evaluated, this overhead turned
out to be negligible, but it is possible that this may be an issue for applications
which perform a large number of repeated ﬁlename lookups.
Compromise of Legitimate Containers or Host: From a security perspective
exposing certain device nodes to containers poses a major challenge as device drivers
39https://www.opengl.org/
39http://sourceforge.net/projects/extremetuxracer/
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pose and signiﬁcant attack vector by exposing uncompartmentalized interfaces to
code running in kernel space.
Privilege Escalation: Our design allows mandatory access control policies to be
enforced for containerized applications. This forms the basis for the permission
system considered in the system model described in Section 4.1. Permissions that
can be granted to an application is limited by the local device policy. The policy
reconciliation used in the migration scheme respects the device policy.
Our design relies on system services supporting RPC, such as D-Bus and the X11
display server being able to enforce access control policies based on callers security
context in order to avoid so called Confused Deputy40attacks.
The lack of container-awareness in LSMs poses a challenge in our design. The need
for compartmentalization of both device drivers and LSM policies has been known
for some time [Bie06]. Our overlay-based relabeling is only a workaround for this
deﬁcit. Path-based MAC LSMs allow for some additional ﬂexibility in this regard,
but with a separate set of drawbacks.
Denial of Service: Although we also exposed /dev/random and /dev/urandom in
our container setup, as these devices access a global entropy pool exposing these
poses a couple or risks that are not easily addressed. For /dev/random there exists
theoretical risk that a malicious container might be able to predict the output for
another container or host [DPR+13]. In addition, as /dev/urandom employs blocking
semantics, there exists a very real risk that a malicious container may attempt
to exhaust all available entropy in the entropy pool and thus mount a DoS on
cryptographic applications relying on high-entropy random number generation for
e.g. key generation.
40CWE-441: Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/441.html
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Our prototype also does not currently provide resource control, making it susceptible
to resource exhaustion attacks. In Section 2.6 we account for kernel features that
can be used to address this.
7 Related Work
Zap [OSSN02] is a system for process migration for Linux. Zap introduces the
notion of PrOcess Domains (PODs), which are used to contain migratable processes.
A POD decouples processes from dependencies on the host operating system and
other processes by providing processes a virtualized view of the operating system by
associating virtual identiﬁers with operating system resources. The approach bears
some resemblance to Linux namespaces, although Zap predates the Linux namespace
implementation by several years. Zap virtualization is achieved by intercepting
system calls and translating physical resource names in arguments and returns values
to virtual names and vice versa.
During migration, a POD along with all processes it contains is suspended and the
state of the POD written to a ﬁle. This checkpoint ﬁle can subsequently be used
to restart the POD along with its processes and restore the state at time of the
checkpoint. In order to reduce the amount of data that has to been transferred
during a migration, Zap leverages distributed ﬁlesystems such as NFS to store the
ﬁlesystem visible within a POD and mounts the ﬁlesystem within the POD's virtual
ﬁlesystem hierarchy.
Linux-VServer 41 is another solution for compartmentalizing the userspace environ-
ment into multiple distinct units. It is mainly aimed at providing VPS environments
for server consolidation. Linux-VServer is not based on mainline Linux namespaces,
but distributed as a set of kernel patches that extend existing kernel structures to
make them aware of Linux-VServer contexts. Each context hides processes outside
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its scope and prevents interaction between processes in diﬀerent contexts. This is
achieved by providing isolation of shared memory and IPC primitives, user and
process IDs, Unix pseudo-teletype devices and sockets. Linux-Vserver also adds a
per-context capability mask that limits the capabilities available to processes within
a context. It also provides Plan 9-style private namespaces for ﬁlesystem isolation,
chroot barrier support and a uniﬁcation mechanism for sharing ﬁles between dis-
tinct contexts utilizing a shared ﬁlesystem. The purpose of uniﬁcation is to reduce
the overall resource consumption via the use of hard links. If the ﬁle is modiﬁed in
a particular context, the link is broken to avoid the changes from being visible in
other contexts.
OpenVZ 42 is a open source, container-based virtualization solution for Linux, com-
mercialized by Parallels, Inc. OpenVZ is the basis for the commercial Parallels
Cloud Server which supports both traditional and container-based virtualization for
Internet hosting services. OpenVZ is notable, because the team behind it has made
signiﬁcant contributions to the operating system-level virtualization mechanisms
merged in the mainline kernel. As a result, the OpenVZ tools are able to operate,
although with reduced functionality, on a upstream Linux kernel.
One of the distinguishing features of OpenVZ is CR functionality that is supported
via an in-kernel implementation. Eﬀorts were made to merge CR support into
the upstream Linux kernel. However, the considerable complexity of the in-kernel
implementation eventually lead to the rejection of the OpenVZ CR patches.
Not deterred by the rejection of the in-kernel CR implementation, the OpenVZ team
took another approach. Checkpoint/Restore In Userspace43 (CRIU) is a users pace
tool for Linux which allows running applications to be suspended, and checkpointed
to the ﬁlesystem as a collection of ﬁles. These ﬁles can later be used to restore
41http://linux-vserver.org
42http://openvz.org
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the application to the state at the point it was suspended, and continue execution.
CRIU diﬀers from the OpenVZ CR feature in that it is, as the name implies, mainly
implemented in userspace, with only minor changes to the kernel exposing various
internal kernel resources to be read and modiﬁed from userspace.
With the inclusion of resource namespaces in the mainline Linux kernel, a number
of eﬀorts to provide containers based on these have been proposed. The most promi-
nent of these is the LXC Linux Containers project44. LXC provides an userspace
interface for the mainline kernel operating system-level virtualization features. It
can make use of the kernel resource namespaces, AppArmor and SELinux MAC pro-
ﬁles, seccomp, chroots, capabilities and control groups. LXC consists of the liblxc C
library with language bindings for several other programming languages, and a set
of a command line tools for managing containers.
The libvirt virtualization API45is a toolkit with the goal of providing a common
interface to the diﬀerence virtualization capabilities supported in recent versions of
Linux and other operating system. It supports both OpenVZ and LxC containers,
as well as a number of traditional hypervisors such as the KVM/QEMU hypervisor
on Linux, the XEN hypervisor on Linux and Solaris, the FreeBSD bhyve46 hypervi-
sor, the VMware ESX and GSX hypervisors and the Microsoft Hyper-V hypervisor.
The libvirt API provides operations to provision, create, modify, monitor, control,
migrate and stop the virtualized domains, depending on the capabilities of the un-
derlying virtualization solution.
A recent user of operating system-level virtualization primitives in Linux is Docker 47,
a platform for automating the deployment of distributed applications in cloud en-
vironments. In the Docker deployment model, system administrators can provide
43http://criu.org
44http://linuxcontainers.org
46http://bhyve.org/
46http://libvirt.org/
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standardized environments to development, QA, or operations personnel in the form
of Docker containers. Docker containers consist of a ﬁlesystem image used to set up
the application to be deployed along with any dependencies. The Docker Engine
provides packaging tools to automate the creation of containers to a high degree.
Docker containers also allow diﬀerences in in the underlying infrastructure, such as
the speciﬁc OS variant (distribution), to be abstracted away. The containers can
then be deployed on any system which provides the Docker Engine.
Docker can use LXC, either on its own or via libvirt as a back-end for the execution
environments used to run containers, but LXC was recently superseded by libcon-
tainer 48 speciﬁcally developed for Docker, as the default back-end. The Docker
libcontainer is a Go library which oﬀers an interface to the kernel's without depen-
dencies such as LXC. It has support for namespaces, control groups, capabilities,
AppArmor proﬁles, network interfaces and ﬁrewalling rules.
Cells [ADH+11] is a virtualization architecture for Android, which allows multiple
virtual phones to run concurrently on a single physical phone. Only one virtual
phone, the foreground virtual phone, is displayed at a time, while other virtual
phones are invisible in the background.
Virtual phones are isolated from each other by the means of resource namespaces.
Cells introduces a new kernel-level mechanism, device namespaces49, which provide
hardware resource multiplexing and isolation. Unlike other kernel namespaces, de-
vice namespaces do not virtualize identiﬁers, but are used by device drivers or kernel
subsystems to tag data structures or register callback functions, which are called
when a device namespace changes state. Each virtual phone in Cells is running in
a device namespace of its own. Callbacks triggered when a virtual phone changes
between foreground and background state allow devices to respond diﬀerently de-
47https://www.docker.com/
48https://github.com/docker/libcontainer
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pending on whether a virtual phone is in the foreground or in the background. The
implementation of device namespaces in cells provides either wrappers around ex-
isting device drivers, modiﬁes kernel subsystems to take into account device state
or modiﬁes individual device drivers to take device namespace state into account.
In 2011, the company Cellrox50 was founded to commercialize Cells. The Cell-
rox multi-persona platform is marketed as an enterprise mobility solution enabling
BYOD. It adds remote management support to Cells that allows corporate IT de-
partments to manage the corporate persona on their employees' devices. Other
commercial BYOD solutions include Samsung KNOX51and VMware Horizon Mo-
bile52
Current technology in the ﬁeld of IVI connectivity include MirrorLink53, which is
a device interoperability standard for integration between smartphones and vehicle
infotainment systems. In the MirrorLink architecture, applications are hosted and
run on the smartphone while the driver and passengers interact with the applica-
tions via IVI system peripherals such as steering wheel controls, dashboard buttons
or touch screens. MirrorLink utilizes well-established, non-proprietary technolo-
gies such as IP, USB, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Real-Time Protocol (RTP, for audio) and
Universal Plug and Play (UPnP). The Virtual Network Computing (VNC) protocol
is used to replicate the phone display in the car navigation display and communicate
user input back to the mobile device.
The MirrorLink architecture is inﬂuenced by the state of current IVI systems,
which are not able to match the functionality of contemporary smartphones. To-
49https://github.com/Cellrox/devns-patches
50http://www.cellrox.com/
52http://www.vmware.com/mobile-secure-desktop/overview
52https://www.samsung.com/global/business/mobile/platform/mobile-platform/knox/
53http://www.mirrorlink.com/technology
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day, the GENIVI®54industry consortium drives the broad adoption of Linux-based
operating systems, middleware and platforms for automotive IVI systems.
8 Conclusion
In this thesis we present the detailed design of a container-based isolation solution
for Linux comprised of isolated dynamic security domains. Its deﬁning features are
the use of mandatory access control to strengthen the isolation provided by the
resource namespaces. We also present a proof-of-concept prototype which utilizes
dynamic isolated domains for application migrations which takes into account access
control policies associated with the migrated application.
Our design shows that existing OS-level virtualization features in the Linux kernel
can be used for dynamic application conﬁnement. In an attempt to improve the
deployability of the solution, we intentionally restricted ourselves to kernel features
already available in contemporary Linux variants. Our evaluations identiﬁes a num-
ber of gaps in the design, which are not easily addressed without appropriate kernel
primitives not currently readily available. The major gaps in the compartmental-
izations capabilities of Linux which are visible in our design are the lack of device
and security namespaces. Both are topics of ongoing work by the Linux kernel
community.
It is easy to draw parallels between the development of hardware virtualization
technology in the 60s and the development of OS-level virtualization in Unix-like
operating system. Currently there exists many systems that are capable of com-
partmentalizing a partial set of operating system resources. Despite its limitations
Linux namespaces are one of the more mature solutions currently available.
54http://www.genivi.org
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